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Abstract. Natural hazards can be seen as a function of
a speciﬁc natural process and human (economic) activity.
Wherebythebulkofliteratureonnaturalhazardmanagement
has its focus on the natural process, an increasing number of
scholars is emphasizing the importance of human activity in
this context. Existing literature has identiﬁed certain socio-
economic factors that determine the impact of natural disas-
ters on society. The purpose of this paper is to highlight the
effects of the institutional framework that inﬂuences human
behaviorbysettingincentivesandtopointouttheimportance
of institutional vulnerability. Results from an empirical in-
vestigation of large scale natural disasters between 1984 and
2004 show that countries with better institutions experience
less victims and lower economic losses from natural disas-
ters. In addition, the results suggest a non-linear relation-
ship between economic development and economic disaster
losses. The suggestions in this paper have implications for
the discussion on how to deal with the adverse effects of nat-
ural hazards and how to develop efﬁcient adaption strategies.
1 Introduction
The absolute number of natural catastrophes within the last
ten years as compared to the 1960s has increased by a factor
of 2.2 the economic losses from natural hazards have been
increasing by a factor of 6.7 in the same period (Munich Re
Group, 2004). In addition, the recent report from the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that
economic losses from natural hazards are world-wide on the
riseandthistrendisnotgoingtostopinthenearfuture(Parry
et al., 2007). People settle down in regions exposed to natural
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hazards that have been untouched before and the population
density in hazardous areas is constantly increasing. This de-
velopment has got several reasons:
(a) The exploitation of scarce resources in these areas for
production purposes. These could either be natural re-
sources such as fossil fuels, metals, minerals or agri-
cultural resources as well as landscapes for tourism or
health purposes.
(b) Population is growing, and space to settle down is lim-
ited. Hence, urban areas are expanding and people
move to new areas.
(c) People try to escape from over-populated urban areas in
order to increase their living standards.
So far, natural disasters are viewed as sudden shocks to so-
ciety and the economy. However, several scientiﬁc sources1
suggest that anthropogenic climate change increases the fre-
quency of extreme weather events and change the climate
in certain regions tremendously. This increase in frequency
of events could mean that at least in some regions of the
world natural catastrophes may become ”normality” rather
than rare shocks. Therefore, it is essential to identify the
factors that determine a society’s vulnerability against natu-
ral hazards (Fuchs et al., 2007). Apart from country-speciﬁc
climatic and topographic factors numerous socio-economic
factors have been found to be key determinants of a society’s
response to natural hazards. The level of economic develop-
mentbothdeterminesthegroupswithinsocietymostaffected
by disasters (Albala-Bertrand, 1993) and the probability of
survival (Kahn, 2005). Skidmore and Toya (2007) found that
higher income, educational attainment and greater openness
1See Parry et al. (2007) or Steininger and Weck-Hannemann
(2002) for Alpine regions.
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fortradereducesbothcapitallossesandhumanfatalities. Us-
ing data on major earthquakes Anbarci et al. (2005) show
that countries with higher income inequality (measured by
the Gini-coefﬁcient2) experience higher fatality rates.
The purpose of this paper is to augment this existing ﬁeld
of natural hazard research by the factor of institutional vul-
nerability. The basic question underlying this analysis is:
“How do natural hazards affect society?” If a river runs over
the bank or an avalanche runs down a hill it is not a natural
disaster per se it is just a natural process. The natural pro-
cess becomes a “natural hazard” as soon as human beings,
infrastructure or other forms of tangible or intangible capital
is threatened and/or destroyed (Varnes, 1988). Whether this
natural process does not affect individuals at all or “evolves”
to a natural disaster is not solely in the realm of the natural
environmental, but crucially depends on the behavior of hu-
man beings living in this environment. Based on the ideas
of institutional economics, human (economic) activity is de-
termined by institutions. In this case (and throughout this
paper) institutions do not solely describe formal organisa-
tions but rather encompass general rules of human interac-
tion and political decision-making, laws and policies as well
as traditions or norms. This institutional framework sets the
incentives that affect individuals’ actions and conversely in-
stitutions evolve from human activity (Frey, 1990). Some
institutional settings result in economic growth and devel-
opment, while other institutions results in stagnation (Ace-
moglu et al., 2001). Countries with better institutions and
less distortionary policies invest more in physical and hu-
man capital and apply their existing factor endowment more
efﬁciently (North, 1990). This could also apply to a nation’s
effort to mitigate the effects of natural hazards. Therefore, an
analysis of the effects of natural hazards on society does not
solely depend on a region’s topographic or climatic exposure
to natural processes orits level of economic development but
the region’s institutional vulnerability to natural processes
that ultimately determines whether natural processes result
in a natural hazard or not.
The purpose of this paper is twofold: ﬁrst, the rela-
tionship between economic development and vulnerability
against natural disasters is examined. The results suggest
that economic development partly reduces disaster victims
and losses, but increasing wealth inverts this relationship
and thus causes relatively higher (economic) losses in high-
income nations. Based on these results the study wants to
point out that higher income does not necessarily lead to bet-
ter protection against natural disasters. Therefore, the sec-
ond aim is to highlight the importance of institutional quality
as an additional socio-economic factor to provide protection
against natural hazards. Although some studies have already
touched the interaction between institutional quality and the
2The Gini coefﬁcient is a statistical measure of income inequal-
ity. It ranges from 0 (income is equally distributed among the mem-
bers of society) to 1 (perfect inequality).
death toll from earthquakes (Kahn, 2005) or output volatil-
ity caused by natural hazards (Raddatz, 2005) a comparative
empirical analysis of institutional quality on economic dis-
aster losses is missing. The econometric study in this paper
tries to ﬁll this gap.
The next section gives an overview of the existing litera-
ture. Section 3 discusses the relevance of institutional vul-
nerability in natural hazard management. Section 4 provides
an empirical analysis of this issue and section 5 concludes.
2 Socio-economic determinants of disaster losses
The direct effect of a disaster on society is the loss of hu-
man lives and the destruction of physical capital. Direct de-
struction of input factors is followed by disruptions in pro-
duction and output. The cross-country analysis by Tavares
(2004) shows that natural disasters have a small but negative
effect on economic growth. Several studies concentrating on
the macro-economic impacts of natural disasters on devel-
oping countries provide similar results. Rasmussen (2004)
presents a comprehensive study of natural disasters in the
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union. He concludes that dis-
aster damages in this area amount to about 0.5% of GDP.
The panel study by Auffret (2003) also ﬁnds a decline in out-
put due to natural disasters in Latin American and Caribbean
economies.
Empirical economic analysis on vulnerability has identi-
ﬁed a number of factors that mitigate the impacts of natural
catastrophes on society. There is broad consensus that eco-
nomic development mitigates the effects from natural disas-
ters. Kahn (2005) shows that countries with higher per capita
income experience a similar amount of catastrophic events
but suffer less death from these events. Using a sample of
3893 major catastrophes Skidmore and Toya (2007) conﬁrm
this ﬁnding. They also ﬁnd that economic development and
economic losses from disasters are inversely correlated. In
addition, Skidmore and Toya (2007) identify a number of
other factors of social exposure: Nation with higher levels
of educational attainment and greater openness for trade are
less vulnerable to disasters. A stronger ﬁnancial sector and a
smaller size of government (measured as the fraction of gov-
ernment expenditure per GDP) are associated with a lower
disaster death toll. Anbarci et al. (2005) analyse the effects
income inequality (using the Gini coefﬁcient) on earthquake
fatalities. Their results suggest that a nation’s inequality –
as a proxy for the nation’s inability to adopt preventive mea-
suresandpolicies(e.g.thecreationandenforcementofbuild-
ing codes) – increases the number of earthquake fatalities.
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3 Institutional vulnerability
Institutions deﬁne and constrain the set of choices of individ-
uals. If this applies to economic activities in general North
(1990), this should also apply to decisions related to protec-
tion against natural hazards. Decisions linked to protection
measures and natural hazard mitigation strategies take place
in a complex environment. A vast amount of different eco-
nomic, social and environmental variables need to be taken
into account during the decision making process which cre-
ates uncertainty for the individual. It is the purpose of in-
stitutions to reduce this individual uncertainty. According to
North (1990) “Institutions are the rules of the game in a so-
ciety or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints
that shape human interaction” (p. 3). This rather general deﬁ-
nition of institutions was more speciﬁed by Frey (1990), who
classiﬁes three types of institutions:
1. Institutions are rules or procedures that clarify how de-
cisions are made within society. These decision-making
systems can be the market, democracy, hierarchical
decision-making or negotiating systems. In the area of
natural hazard management the market and possible im-
perfections and distortions as well as drawbacks of the
existing political mechanisms are of particular impor-
tance.
2. Formal or informal rules that inﬂuence individual be-
havior such as laws, social norms, traditions or infor-
mal rules deﬁning the behavior within a group or the
family. Regarding natural hazards this type of institu-
tions could range from the general legal setting (regu-
lating i.e. preventive measures, ﬁnancial support in the
case of emergency, the distribution of competencies) to
the behavioral standards within a ski-hiking group in an
avalanche prone area.
3. Groups of individuals that share a common aim – orga-
nizations. These could be e.g. political parties, authori-
ties, companies, NGOs or clubs.
Beside politicians, companies or interest groups, organiza-
tions such as insurance companies, experts or tourist associ-
ations might be of special interests in the area of natural haz-
ards. The aim is to ﬁnd which institutional setting builds the
frame under which individual preferences for natural hazard
management and protective measures are reﬂected in an op-
timal way (Weck-Hannemann, 2005). Prior to the decision,
which institutional framework is to choose for the allocation
of resources innatural hazard management, acomparison be-
tween the existing alternatives is required. However, a pre-
cise calculation of an institutional system’s inefﬁciencies is
not possible. At least a positive comparison of alternative
institutional designs in natural hazard management allows to
examine the strengths and weaknesses of different systems
and identify more efﬁcient institutions. Thus far, only a few
empirical studies analysed the effects of instituions on vul-
nerability against natural hazards. The empirical work by
Kahn (2005) shows that better institutional quality insulates
against death from earthquakes. He used a nation’s level
of democracy, income inequality, ethnic fragmentation and
good governance indicators as proxies for institutional qual-
ity. Countries with better institutions, lower income inequal-
ity and higher levels of democracy experience fewer earth-
quake fatalities. He argues that this might be explained that
nations with a bad instituional framework do not properly
enforce zoning laws and building codes. Apart from these
generalinstitutionalvariablessubstantialworkhasbeendone
regarding the societal risk-transfer-mechanisms (e.g. disaster
insurance, governmental relief) to reduce the ﬁnancial losses
from disasters. The market for insurance against ﬂooding
works imperfectly or fails completely. Adverse selection and
moral hazard can only partly explain these market imperfec-
tions (Jaffee and Russell, 2003). Kunreuther (2000) deﬁned
the situation of distorted demand and insufﬁcient supply on
the market for natural hazard insurance as the disaster syn-
drome. Individuals tend to underinsure because of a) the un-
derestimation of risk of low-probability high loss events and
b) the expected ﬁnancial relief by the government or private
charity. This market failure has led to different forms of gov-
ernment intervention in the market for disaster insurance. In
Europe several countries (France, Great Britain, Spain and
Switzerland) have installed a system of mandatory insurance,
where every house-owner and company is obliged to pur-
chase insurance coverage against natural-disaster-risks (for
an overview of the different forms in each country see Von
Ungern-Sternberg, 2004).
In regions without institutionalized insurance regimes,
risk-transfer against natural hazards is in the realm of the
individuals and politicians. According to Skidmore (2001)
individuals try to protect themselves against potential disas-
ter damages by building up a capital buffer. His results sug-
gest that this form of self-protecting is rather inefﬁcient as
the buffer stock is very often larger than the actual losses.
However, if self-insurance does not cover the disaster losses
governments provide catastrophe assistance and ﬁnancial re-
lief. Governmental relief is either organized through a fund
(e.g. Austria) or politicians provide ad-hoc ﬁnancial assis-
tance to the victims (e.g. Germany).
Governmental disaster assistance can lead to the problem
of charity hazard, the phenomenon that people underinsure
or do not insure at all due to anticipated governmental assis-
tanceand/orprivatecharity(RaschkyandWeck-Hannemann,
2007; Schwarze and Wagner, 2004). In addition to an inefﬁ-
cientamountofinsurancecoverage, ﬁnancialassistancefrom
thegovernmentdoesrarelymeettheneedsofthedisastervic-
tims and leads to an inefﬁcient allocation of public funds.
An econometric study by Garrett and Sobel (2003) show
that almost half of federal disaster payments in the US are
politically motivated. They show that disaster expenditure
by the FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) is
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signiﬁcantly higher in election years (around $140million as
compared to non-election years) and that states with higher
political impact have on average a higher rate of disaster dec-
larations (a requisite for ﬁnancial assistance). Besley and
Burgess (2002) ﬁnd similar results using panel date from In-
dia on governmental food programs after ﬂooding destroyed
crop. The work by Mustafa (2003) concluded that after the
2001 in Pakistan public support cheques where mainly dis-
tributed among family members and political supporters of
local councilors coordinating the governmental assistance.
The impact of institutions on a more efﬁcient allocation of
resources in natural hazard management is not only restricted
to post-disaster relief. The identiﬁcation and mapping of
hazard zones, the construction of preventive measures (e.g.
dykes, levees or avalanche barriers) or the maintenance of
early warning systems largely show the features of public
goods (Congleton, 2006). Pure public goods show non-
rivalness and non-excludability in consumption. Although
the majority of preventive measures are not purely non-rival
and non-excludable goods, the concept of public goods is a
good explanation why common action is needed in this ﬁeld.
In addition, preventive measures can create positive and neg-
ative externalities. Take for example a levee build by an up-
stream town. Although this town is protected against ﬂoods,
the levees might result in more water in the river channel and
thus increasing the risk of a ﬂood for downstream communi-
ties. This is another reason why most of the above mentioned
pre-disaster measures are provided by federal governments
and agencies or international organizations.
Iftheresponsibilityforpublicgoodprojectsinnaturalhaz-
ard management is highly centralized, a informational deﬁcit
occurs between the central agency and the local demands.
These differences can lead to an inefﬁcient allocation of pub-
lic funds and an inappropriate provision of protective mea-
sures. Case studies on the events linked to hurricane ”Ka-
trina” by Congleton (2006) and Sobel and Leeson (2006)
show how centralized action leads to an insufﬁcient supply of
preventive measures against ﬂoods in New Orleans and de-
layedgovernmentalresponseintheaftermath. Pelling(1999)
argues that a political system where decision-making power
is in the hands of an elite increases the vulnerability against
ﬂoods of speciﬁc population groups in Guyana. Depoorter
(2006) suggests that shared political accountability is an ad-
ditional reason for deﬁcits in disaster management.
Political economists also identify constitutions that protect
individual property rights as a key for allocative efﬁciency
and economic development. Human economic interaction
can be subject to informational asymmetries, free-riding and
incentives to shirk. Uncertainty and lack of information in
the exchange of goods that are accompanied with natural
hazards (e.g. housing) lead exactly to these inefﬁciencies. A
constitutional environment that enforces property rights can
decreasetransactioncosts, reduceuncertaintyandprovidein-
dividuals with some degree of security (Leblang, 1996). A
legal system that fosters transperancy and disclosure of haz-
ards increases the level of information for all participants in
a transaction and could lead to more risk-aware decisions of
individuals within society. Using data of the California hous-
ing market, Beron et al. (1997) show the positive effects of
a law that enforces the disclosure of earthquake risks dur-
ing real estate transactions. After the information disclosure
act was issued house prices reﬂected the earthquake risk of a
property in a better way.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section an empirical analysis on the effects of insti-
tutions on disaster losses is presented. Data on natural dis-
asters stem from the EM-DAT Center for Research on the
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in Brussels (EM-DAT,
2007). EM-DAT has collected around 12000 reports of dif-
ferent disasters, such as ﬂood, storms, earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, landslides or tsunamis. The disaster has to fulﬁll
at least one of the following criteria in order to be included in
the database: 10 or more people reported killed, 100 people
reported affected, declaration of a state of emergency, call for
international assistance. Therefore, disasters that occurred in
thinly populated areas are not included in the database and
in the analysis. This dataset provides information about the
location of the disaster, the total number of people killed and
affectedaswellasthetotallosses(in1000USD).Thesample
includes data on earthquakes, ﬂoods, wind storms, volcanic
eruptions, tidal waves, landslides, avalanches, droughts, ex-
treme temperature events and wild ﬁres. Data on economic
development, measured by per capita gross domestic product
(GDP p.c.), and population are provided by the Penn World
Table 6.2 Heston, Alan and Summers, Robert and Aten, Bet-
tina (2006). The International Country Risk Guide3 provided
the data on institutional aspects (The PRS Group Inc., 2006).
In order to limit the scope of this empirical analysis the ex-
amination is limited to two speciﬁc institutional indicators
that reﬂect a wide area of a nation’s institutional framework.
The ﬁrst one is governmental stability, which is an assess-
ment of both, the national government’s ability to carry out
its declared program(s) and its ability to stay in ofﬁce. It
consists of three components: governmental unity, legisla-
tive strength and popular support. This indicator serves as
a proxy for a country’s ability to issue laws and regulations
as well as enforce existing laws. A higher level of this insti-
tutional variable should indicate the existence of more efﬁ-
cient preventive policies and a stronger enforcement of these
policies (e.g. zoning and building codes). The second institu-
tional indicator is investment climate. This indicator covers
institutional rules such as the risk of expropriation or con-
tract law. The main intention to include this indicator stems
3The International Country Risk Guide is a collection of polit-
ical information and economic data. The assessment of political
risks is based on the subjective assignment of speciﬁc risk-points to
each category by experts of the PRS Group.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Total no. killed
(per 1.000inh.) 2.903 0.009 0.007 7.77E−7 2.474
Damage/GDP 1103 0.152 0.217 1.98E−6 0.997
GDP p.c. 2792 6943 8496 157 39535
Total affected 2.903 1083408 1040000 0 300000000
Government
stabillity 2.903 7.887 2.354 1 12
Investment
climate 2.903 6.784 2.173 0 12
from the idea that property rights are a key determinant for
an efﬁcient allocation of resources, which is also important
in natural hazard management. The sample size is restricted
mainly by the availability of data on disaster losses and the
collected institutional indicators. The International Country
RiskGuidestartsat1984. Thereforethedisastersinthissam-
ple took place between 1984 and 2004. Data on the death
toll and economic disaster losses4 are not available for all
disasters in the EM-DAT. The ﬁnal sample consists of 2792
events where numbers of disaster victims are available and
1103 events with ﬁgures on economic losses. Table 1 reports
the descriptive statistics of the disaster losses as well as the
key socio-economic variables5.
To determine the relationship between economic develop-
ment, institutional vulnerability and disaster impacts, the fol-
lowing log-log regression function6 is derived:
Ln
 
Lossesijt

= β0 + β1Ln(GDPjt) + β2Ln(GDP2
jt)
+β3Ln(Affectedijt) + β4Ln(Landareajt)
+β5Ln(Populationjt) + β6INSTjt + ijt (1)
where LN(Lossesijt) reﬂects the dependent variables in the
two sets of regressions that are estimated. The ﬁrst analysis
focuses on disaster fatalities, LN(Deathsijt), of disaster event
i, in country j and year t. In order to test the assumption
that the relationship between losses and level of development
4Kahn (2005) and Skidmore and Toya (2007) already argued
that the numbers on economic losses should be interpreted with
care. In particular, developing countries have an incentive to ex-
aggerate damage costs to receive higher international disaster assis-
tance. In addition, damage data from developing countries is very
often inaccurate due to the lack of insurance markets, bookkeeping
and governmental bureaus collecting data in an appropriate way.
5The large max. value of total affected of 300000000 stems
from the 1987 drought in India
6Taking the natural log of the variables allows to interpret the
regression coefﬁcient as elasticities. This makes the different coef-
ﬁcients more comparable. For the institutional variables no loga-
rithmic transformation was applied.
is non-linear the natural log of GDP p.c., LN(GDPjt),and ,
LN(GDPjt)2, are introduced simultaneously. To control for
the social magnitude of a disaster the natural log the total
number of affected people, LN(Affectedijt), is taken. In ac-
cordance with Skidmore and Toya (2007) land area, Land
areajt, and population, Populationjt, are included as addi-
tional control variables. The variable of main interest is rep-
resented by vector INSTjt, that includes the indicator for
governmental stability and investment climate. βx are co-
efﬁcients to be estimated and ijt is the error term. In the
second set of estimates, LN(Deathsijt) is replaced by the
monetary damage caused by event i, in country j at time
t, LN(
Damage
GDP ijt),
According to the existing empirical literature the level of
economic evelopment reduces disaster losses. However, this
effect it is reasonable to assume that the mitigative effect is
diminished higher concentration of wealth that could accom-
pany economic development. Therefore, LN(GDPjt) is ex-
pected to have a negative and LN(GDPjt)2 a positive sign.
Better institutions should lead to a better allocation of re-
sources, better laws and legislation as well as better law and
thus decrease the losses. The effect of population and size is
ambiguous, although one might expect that bigger countries
(in terms of population) have economies of scale in provid-
ing mitigative measures and more people increase the dam-
age potential.
The results of both sets of regression are represented in
Table 1. Columns 1–3 show the results of the estimates for
the determinants of disaster fatalities. The baseline estimates
in column 1 indicate that GDP p.c. and population reduce
c.p. the number of disaster fatalities, while the social magni-
tude of the disaster increases the death toll. A 10% increase
in GDP p.c. results in about 8.74% lower death toll. The re-
sults do not support the hypothesis of non-linearity for the
estimates on disaster victims. In columns 2 and 3 the insti-
tutional variables have been added. Both governmental sta-
bility and investment climate signiﬁcantly reduce the amount
of disaster victims signifcantly. A 1-point increase on the 12-
pointgovernmentstability(investmentclimate)scalereduces
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/8/627/2008/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 8, 627–634, 2008632 P. A. Raschky: Natural hazards, economic growth and institutions
Table 2. Natural disaster losses, economic development and institutions.
LN(Number killed p.c.) LN(Damage/GDP)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Ln(GDP p.c.) –0.874∗ –0.841∗ –1.042∗∗ –4.784∗∗∗ –5.012∗∗∗ –5.771∗∗∗
(0.514) (0.491) (0.516) (1.788) (1.708) (1.727)
Ln(GDP p.c.)2 0.019 0.019 0.032 0.315∗∗∗ 0.299∗∗∗ 0.348∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.029) (0.031) (0.104) (0.100) (0.103)
Ln(Number affected) 0.180∗∗∗ 0.172∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.404∗∗∗ 0.403∗∗∗ 0.401∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
LN(Land area) 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.078 0.089 0.058
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.119) (0.120) (0.119))
LN(Population) –0.896∗∗∗ –0.892∗∗∗ –0.896∗∗∗ –0.880∗∗∗ –0.867∗∗∗ –0.850∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.059) (0.061) (0.099) (0.103) (0.098)
Government stability –0.049∗∗∗ –0.074∗∗
(0.012) (0.030)
Investment climate –0.044∗∗ –0.115∗∗
(0.017) (0.119)
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.529 0.531 0.530 0.205 0.212 0.212
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Obs. 2792 2792 2792 1103 1103 1103
Notes: Clustered OLS-estimates. Robust standard errors are given in parenthesis.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ indicate signiﬁcance at the 1, 5 and 10%.
the death toll by about 4.9% (4.4%). Considering the cross-
section structure of the analysis, all speciﬁcations have a rea-
sonable R2 (about 50%) and it increases after the introduc-
tion of the institutional variables.
We now turn our focus on the results for economic loss
(columns 4–6). Once again the ﬁrst step was to estimate
a baseline speciﬁcation without controlling for institutions.
In contrast to the estimates on disaster victims, LN(GDPjt)2
has a signiﬁcant positive impact on economic disaster losses.
This indicates a non-linear relationship between economic
development and economic losses. Economic development
provides protection but with a diminishing rate. The insti-
tutional variables have once again a signiﬁcant reducing im-
pact on economic losses and support the idea that institutions
matter in natural hazard preparedness.
5 Conclusion and suggestions for future research
The contribution of this work is to show that the institutional
framework is a key socio-economic determinant of a nation’s
vulnerability against natural disasters. Governmental stabil-
ity and a lower risk of expropriation have a clearly signiﬁcant
impact on both, the death toll and the overall economic losses
from natural disasters. These results suggest that institutions
reduce the adverse effects of natural disasters and that insti-
tutional vulnerability is a promising issue for future research.
Apart from institutions, the results conﬁrm the idea that
economic development is an important factor in determining
a society’s vulnerability against natural hazards. The results
show, that higher-income countries experience a lower death
toll from natural disasters. However, the econometric anal-
ysis also shows that monetary disaster losses and economic
development have a non-linear relationship. This means, that
economic development is a good protection against natural
hazards, however with a diminishing rate. In countries or
areas (e.g. Florida) that experience a concentration of assets
that is larger than the installation of appropriate counter mea-
sures the relationship of income an vulnerability could even
invert. However, the focus of empirical economic research
so far was mainly on the effect of economic development and
only to a limited extent on other socio-economic variables.
Future research on institutional vulnerability should incor-
porate a number of issues. The empirical studies on the
effects of natural hazards on economic development have
a clear mid to long-run perspective. However, according
to the suggestions in the recent IPCC-report the frequency
of climate-induced natural disasters (e.g. hurricanes, ﬂoods)
is likely to increase in the near future (Parry et al., 2007).
This calls for more emphasis on the analysis of the short-
term effects of natural disasters on society. The analysis
by Albala-Bertrand (1993) and Auffret (2003) estimated the
short-term effects of disaster losses on economy. In con-
trary to the results of long-run estimates (Skidmore and Toya,
2002) e.g. Raschky (2007) found that ﬂood disaster do have
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a negative effect on regional economy in the short-run. Re-
garding the impact on factor productivity Leiter et al. (2007)
ﬁnd that ﬁrms’ productivity tends to be reduced in the short-
run despite a higher level of factor input. In order to de-
sign more efﬁcient societal decision mechanisms in natural
hazard management we have to gain a more comprehensive
picture on both short and long run impacts of disasters on
economic welfare.
The results presented in this paper only have an explo-
rative character. Future (empirical) research efforts should
be directed towards a more detailed analysis of the interac-
tion between institutional constraints and the sustainable pro-
vision of protective measures. The understanding of incen-
tiveschemesandtheidentifcationofefﬁcientinstituionalset-
tings allows the design of more appropriate societal decision-
mechanisms in natural hazard management.
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